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I. INTRODUCTION
HIS article surveys the most significant changes in intellectual
property law in the past year.' The article considers only those
decisions that are precedential in Texas, or likely to influence the
practice of law in the state. Thus, the cases cited focus on the decisions of
the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and
Federal Circuits. For developments in trademark and copyright law, the
Fifth Circuit's authority is binding, but other Circuits, such as the Second
and Ninth, are considered highly persuasive. Because all cases concern-
ing a substantive issue of patent law are appealed to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, decisions from the Federal Circuit during
the Survey period are also included in this article.2
2007 was another active year in intellectual property law. Together, the
courts addressed many areas of patent litigation considered ripe for re-
form, even as Congress continues to show interest in reforming the patent
statutes. The United States Supreme Court continued its trend of lower-
ing the bar for challenging patents and restricting the scope of patent
rights. The Federal Circuit responded to certain Supreme Court deci-
sions, raised the bar for enhanced damages, and reconsidered the patent-
able scope of business methods. Elsewhere, the Internet spurred
developments in trademark and copyright law. In particular, Internet
search engines have been the foremost battleground with disputes con-
1. The views expressed in this article are the views of the individual authors, and are
not necessarily those of Haynes and Boone, LLP, its attorneys, or any of its clients.
Messrs. McCombs, Philbin, and Hodges wish to thank Don Tiller for his invaluable assis-
tance with this paper.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000); see also Deprenyl Animal Health, Inc. v. Univ. of Toronto
Innovations Found., 297 F.3d 1343, 1348-49 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
[Vol. 61
Intellectual Property
cerning search keywords and meta tags used to direct traffic to video
sharing websites. Also, trademark applicants experienced an increased
cost for incorrectly identifying the underlying goods or services for which
a mark is sought. Technology and intellectual property continue to be
increasingly important in our economy, and the Supreme Court and Con-
gress are responding accordingly.
II. PATENT UPDATE
A. THE SUPREME COURT ON PATENTS
1. Standing for Declaratory Judgments
Under certain circumstances, an accused patent infringer may bring
suit against a patentee by seeking a declaratory judgment. The Declara-
tory Judgment Act allows a party to an "actual controversy" to seek a
declaration of his "rights and other legal relations" in a federal court.
3
The declaration of rights is a court judgment that does not provide for or
order enforcement of those rights.4
a. Lessened Immunity to Suit-Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.
The Supreme Court decided MedImmune against the background of
Federal Circuit jurisprudence barring a licensee from seeking a declara-
tory judgment while still complying with its licensing agreement.5 Prior
to MedImmune, the Federal Circuit, in Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc.,
6
held that a suit is nonjusticiable when a compliant licensee seeks a declar-
atory judgment of invalidity, unenforceability, or scope of a licensed pat-
ent.7 As a result, the MedImmune district court invoked Gen-Probe and
dismissed MedImmune's declaratory judgment action8 and likewise the
Federal Circuit invoked Gen-Probe in affirming the district court's deci-
sion.9 In upholding MedImmune's declaratory judgment action and re-
versing the Federal Circuit,10 the Supreme Court overruled Gen-Probe's
bar on declaratory judgment for compliant licensee.1 ' The Court also re-
jected the Federal Circuit's reasonable-apprehension-of-suit test that
served as a basis for the bar.
1 2
The Gen-Probe rule was an extension of the Federal Circuit's two-part
"pragmatic inquiry" in analyzing the totality of the circumstances for an
Article III controversy, which stated:
13
3. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764, 770-71 (2006) (citing 28
U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2000)).
4. BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 859 (8th Ed. 2004).
5. MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 768.
6. 359 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
7. Id. at 1381.
8. MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 768.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 777.
11. Id. at 774.
12. Id. at 774 n.il.
13. Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376, 1379-80 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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There must be both (1) an explicit threat or other action by the pat-
entee, which creates a reasonable apprehension on the part of the
declaratory judgment plaintiff that it will face an infringement suit,
and (2) present activity [by the declaratory judgment plaintiff] which
could constitute infringement or concrete steps taken [by the declar-
atory judgment plaintiff] with the intent to conduct such activity. 14
It was in the first prong of the inquiry, the reasonable-apprehension-of-
suit test, where a compliant licensee necessarily failed to establish a
controversy.' 5
In its analysis, the Court reiterated that an Article III controversy ex-
ists where the totality of the circumstances establishes "that there is sub-
stantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of
sufficient immediacy and reality .... -16 To find a suit justiciable, the
Court required:
that the dispute be "definite and concrete, touching the legal rela-
tions of parties having adverse legal interests"; and that it be "real
and substantial" and "admi[t] of specific relief through a decree of a
conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what
the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.' 7
Writing for an eight-Justice majority, Justice Scalia noted that the pur-
pose of the Declaratory Judgment Act was to ameliorate the dilemma
inherent in the choice between: (1) abandoning rights; and (2) exercising
those rights at the risk of liability.1 8 Absent an imminent threat of harm,
a declaratory judgment action may be justiciable if the plaintiff was effec-
tively coerced, by the risk of liability, to abandon its rights so as to re-
move the threat of harm. 19 Scalia further noted that, contrary to the
Federal Circuit's Gen-Probe analysis, an action may be justiciable regard-
less of whether the coercive risk of liability lies with the government or a
private party-in either case, the risk of damages arising from infringe-
ment may be sufficiently coercive. 20 Stating in a footnote that the reason-
able-apprehension-of-suit test conflicts with Supreme Court precedent, 21
the Court stated that a party need not breach a license agreement at the
risk of treble damages and a business-crippling injunction before seeking
a declaration of its rights.22
14. Id. at 1380 (quoting BP Chems. Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d 975, 978 (Fed.
Cir. 1993)).
15. Id. at 1381.
16. MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 771 (citing Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S.
270, 273 (1941)).
17. Id. (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937)).
18. Id. at 772-73 (citing Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 152 (1967)).
19. Id. at 773.
20. Id. at 774 (citing Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359, 365 (1943)).
21. Id. at 774 n.11.
22. See id. at 775, 777.
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b. Federal Circuit Response
Since the MedImmune opinion was issued, the Federal Circuit has up-
held the vast majority of declaratory judgment actions seeking a finding
of patent noninfringement or invalidity as justiciable. 23
i. Giving Standing a Leg Up-SanDisk Corp. v.
STMicroelectronics, Inc.24
While negotiating a cross-licensing agreement, STMicroelectronics
("ST") alleged that various SanDisk activities and products infringed ST's
patents on flash memory technology.25 ST supported the allegation with
detailed written and oral analyses of the patent claims and SanDisk's
products.2 6 After six months of negotiation failed to yield an agreement,
SanDisk sued ST seeking a declaratory judgment of noninfringement and
invalidity of ST's patents. 27 The district court determined that SanDisk
did not have a reasonable apprehension of suit and dismissed the declara-
tory judgment action as nonjusticiable. 28
The Federal Circuit held that SanDisk's declaratory judgment action
was justiciable even though ST never threatened an infringement suit,
expressed a lack of intent to sue, and expressed a willingness to continue
the licensing negotiations.29 Applying MedImmune, the Federal Circuit
reasoned that a declaratory judgment action may be justiciable when the
plaintiff is confronted with the dilemma of choosing between "pursuing
arguably illegal behavior" and "abandoning that which he claims a right
to do."'30 Specifically, the court held that an Article III controversy arises
when "a patentee asserts rights under a patent based on certain identified
ongoing or planned activity of another party, and where that party con-
tends that it has the right to engage in the accused activity without
license .... ",31 ST's declaratory judgment action was justiciable because
ST claimed a right to a royalty based on its detailed infringement analysis
of SanDisk's "specific, identified activity."'32
23. See, e.g., Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Forest Labs., Inc., 527 F.3d 1278, 1291 (Fed.
Cir. 2008); Micron Tech. v. Mosaid Techs., 518 F.3d 897, 901-03 (Fed. Cir. 2008); SanDisk
Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Teva Pharms. USA,
Inc. v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Sony Elecs., Inc. v.
Guardian Media Techs., Ltd., 497 F.3d 1271, 1285-87 (Fed. Cir. 2007); but see Benitec
Austl., Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc., 495 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (not justiciable).
24. 480 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
25. Id. at 1374-75.
26. Id. at 1375.
27. Id. at 1376.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1381-83.
30. Id. at 1381.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1382.
20081
SMU LAW REVIEW
ii. New Drug Test Now FDA Approved-Teva Pharmaceuticals
USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp.33
Novartis listed five patents with the U.S. Food and Drug Administra-
tion ("FDA") as part of a new drug application ("NDA") based on a
particular compound.34 Four of those patents were directed to the drug's
therapeutic use and one was directed at its composition. 35 Teva filed an
abbreviated new drug application ("ANDA") with the FDA for a generic
version of a drug based on the same compound, certifying that its drug
did not infringe any of the Novartis patents or that the patents were inva-
lid.36 Novartis sued Teva for infringement 37 of its composition patent and
Teva sought a declaratory judgment of invalidity or noninfringement of
the four therapeutic-use patents. 38 The district court found that Teva
failed to meet the reasonable-apprehension-of-imminent-suit 39 test and
dismissed the declaratory judgment action for want of jurisdiction. 40
The Federal Circuit looked to the totality of the circumstances, as re-
quired by MedImmune, and held that the declaratory judgment action
was justiciable.41 The court noted five circumstances that together sup-
ported justiciability:
(1) Novartis listed its patents with the FDA, indicating that Novartis
could reasonably assert an infringement claim for use of the generic
drug;42
(2) Teva infringed the Novartis patents when it filed the ANDA;43
(3) Congress intended early resolution of patent disputes involving
generic drugs; 44
33. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
34. Id. at 1334.
35. Id.
36. Id. An ANDA is used to speed FDA approval of a generic drug by relying on the
previous approval of bioequivalent drug. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
§ 505(j), 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2000). As part of the application, the applicant must certify
that any patents claiming the approved bioequivalent drug: have not been filed; have ex-
pired; will expire on a specified date; or are invalid or will not be infringed by the generic.
Id.
37. See Teva, 482 F.3d at 1340. Filing an ANDA is a technical infringement of the
Novartis patents under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2000).
38. Teva, 482 F.3d at 1334-35.
39. The reasonable-apprehension-of-imminent-suit test is an evolved form of the rea-
sonable-apprehension-of-suit test and was similarly rejected in MedImmune. See Medlm-
mune, Inc. v. Genetech, Inc. 127 S. Ct. 764, 774 n.ll (2006).
40. Teva, 482 F.3d at 1335.
41. Id. at 1337, 1340, 1345-46.
42. Id. at 1341-42.
43. Id. at 1342. "It shall be an act of infringement to submit-(A) an application
under section 505(j) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ..... 35 U.S.C.
271(e)(2) (2000).
44. Teva, 482 F.3d at 1342-44. Specifically, the court noted the guidelines in 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(5)(C) (2000), outlining how and when an ANDA applicant can bring a declaratoryjudgment action to obtain patent certainty; 35 U.S.C. 271(e)(5), granting jurisdiction to
such declaratory judgment actions; and discussing the congressional goal of allowing quick
introduction of cheap generic drugs to the market. Id. at 1343-44.
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(4) Novartis sued Teva for patent infringement of one of the FDA-
listed patents;45 and
(5) the FDA-listed patents not asserted in Novartis's suit against
Teva could be asserted against Teva in future litigation.46
The court held that, under the circumstances, "Teva has experienced real
and actual injury" that is "traceable to Novartis' conduct" and that the
injury "can be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. '47 Accordingly,
the Federal Circuit held the declaratory judgment action to be
justiciable. 48
In addition, the court commented on the individual strength of each
circumstance, hinting that several would create a justiciable controversy
independent of the others. Because "Novartis would have an immediate
justiciable controversy against Teva as soon as Teva submitted the
ANDA," the Federal Circuit reasoned that submitting the ANDA
"should create a justiciable declatory judgment controversy" for Teva
against Novartis. 49 Similarly, the court explained that challenging a
FDA-listed patent via the ANDA certification, as did Teva, should make
a declaratory judgment action on the patent justiciable.50 Finally, the
court found that Novartis's prior infringement suit on one of the five
FDA-listed patents challenged by Teva's ANDA certification "is disposi-
tive in establishing an actual declaratory judgment controversy as to all"
the challenged patents.5 '
2. Patently Obvious-KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.5 2
The Supreme Court decided KSR against the background of Federal
Circuit jurisprudence requiring a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to
combine elements of prior art references for the combination to be un-
patentable for obviousness-the so-called TSM test.5 3 Applying the TSM
test, the district court held that Teleflex's claimed invention was obvious
because the nature of the problem addressed by the invention would mo-
tivate one having ordinary skill in the art to combine elements of the
prior art references in the fashion claimed. 54 However, the Federal Cir-
cuit held that the district court incorrectly applied the TSM test 55 finding
45. Id. at 1344-45.
46. Id. at 1345.
47. Id. at 1346.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1342.
50. Id. at 1343 (stating that, in the context of an ANDA certification challenge of a
patent, "the only circumstance in which a case or controversy might not exist would arise in
the rare circumstance in which the patent owner and brand drug company have given the
generic applicant a covenant not to sue, or otherwise formally acknowledge that the ge-
neric applicant's drug does not infringe").
51. Id. at 1344.
52. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).
53. See Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 119 F. App'x 282, 285 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(unpublished).
54. Teleflex Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 298 F. Supp. 2d 581, 593-94, 596 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
55. Teleflex, 119 F. App'x at 288.
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that for the nature of the problem to suggest or motivate a combination,
the prior art references must address the precise problem addressed by
the patentee. 56 In reinstating the summary judgment of obviousness, the
Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit's rigid application of the
TSM test.57
In opinions issued after the Supreme Court granted certiorari in KSR,
the Federal Circuit seemed to re-explain the TSM test as requiring a
more flexible approach. 58 Particularly, in DyStar Textilfarben GmbH &
Co. v. C.H. Patrick Co., the Federal Circuit articulated the test as requir-
ing a motivation to combine in: (1) the prior art references; (2) the com-
mon knowledge; (3) the prior art as a whole; or (4) the nature of the
problem. 59
In KSR, the Supreme Court described the obviousness inquiry as "an
expansive and flexible -approach" and noted that the controlling frame-
work from Graham v. John Deere Co. "set forth a broad inquiry and in-
vited courts, where appropriate, to look at any secondary considerations
that would prove instructive."'60 Additionally, the Court stated that
"[t]he combination of familiar elements according to known methods is
likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable
results. "61
Interestingly, the unanimous court did not explicitly reject the TSM
test; rather, it rejected the Federal Circuit's rigid application of the test in
KSR.62 While acknowledging that identifying a reason for one of ordi-
nary skill in the art to combine familiar elements can be important to the
obviousness inquiry, Justice Kennedy noted that the dispositive factor is
the "objective reach of the claim."'63 He explained that the Federal Cir-
cuit's rigid application of the TSM test failed in four notable ways.64
First, in focusing on the patentee's motivation, the Supreme Court
pointed out that the Federal Circuit had failed to analyze obviousness
from the perspective of one having ordinary skill in the art.65 Notably,
the Supreme Court distinguished the problem motivating the patentee
from the problems addressed by the invention. 66 Whereas the Federal
Circuit's rigid application of the TSM test focused on the "precise prob-
56. Id.
57. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1739.
58. See David L. McCombs et al., Intellectual Property Law, 60 SMU L. REV. 1141,
1152-54 (2007) (discussing the Federal Circuit's defense of the TSM test in In re Kahn, 441
F.3d 977 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 464 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2006);
and DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed. Cir.
2006)).
59. DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed.
Cir. 2006).
60. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1739 (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966)).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1742-1743.
63. Id. at 1741-42.





lem that the patentee was trying to solve," 67 the Supreme Court finds that
the proper inquiry focuses on problems known in the art and addressed
by the invention.6 8
Second, in restricting prior art references to those designed to solve the
problems addressed by the invention, the Supreme Court found that the
Federal Circuit failed to account for the ordinary creativity of one having
skill in the art.69 The Court explained that "[c]ommon sense teaches...
that familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary pur-
poses .... "70 Whereas the rigidly applied TSM test would not find na-
ture-of-the-problem motivation to combine elements of prior art
references unless those references were directed to the same problem, the
Supreme Court holds that the proper inquiry considers a broader cate-
gory of prior art.71
Third, the Supreme Court found that the Federal Circuit erred in fail-
ing to consider that a combination was obvious to try as evidence of obvi-
ousness.72 The Court noted that one of ordinary skill in the art may be
motivated by "design need or market pressure" to try those "finite num-
ber of identified, predictable solutions . . . within his or her technical
grasp."'73 Whereas the rigidly applied TSM test teaches that a combina-
tion of elements of prior art references is not obvious merely because it is
obvious to try the combination, the Supreme Court found that "obvious
try" maybe the basis for finding obviousness in certain circumstances. 74
Finally, the Supreme Court explained that the Federal Circuit's rigid
application of the TSM test as a check on hindsight bias failed to allow
the factfinder to exercise common sense in determining obviousness.7 5
Such a rigid test is neither required nor allowed by Court precedent. 76
3. Holdings on the Intangible-Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp.77
Unlike MedImmune and KSR, which were decided in the context of
then-prevailing Federal Circuit jurisprudence, the Microsoft-AT&T dis-
pute involved a question of first impression.78 The issue involved
Microsoft's operating system software and AT&T's patented speech-
67. Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 119 F. App'x 282, 288 (Fed. Cir. 2005).







75. Id. at 1742-43.
76. Id.
77. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007).
78. AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The Federal
Circuit framed the issue as two questions: (1) whether software qualifies as a "component"
under 35 U.S.C. § 271 (f) and; (2) whether foreign-made copies of the software qualify as
supplied from the United States under § 271(f). Id. Under Federal Circuit precedent,
software qualified as a "component." Id. (citing Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399
F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). The second question was one of first impression. Id.
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processor invention. 79 Microsoft stipulated that its licensing of the
software for use on computers sold in the United States contributorily
infringed AT&T's patent.8 0 As a result, the only remaining question was
whether Microsoft infringed the patent under § 271(f) by exporting a
master copy of the software to enable later copying and installation other
computers outside the United States.81 Both the district court and the
Federal Circuit found Microsoft liable for infringement under § 271(f). 82
In reversing, the Supreme Court held that the software did not qualify as
a component until it became a computer-readable copy,83 and that for-
eign-made copies of the software were not "supplied" from the United
States as § 271(f) requires.8 4
Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsberg focused on the nature of
software in determining that the software could not be a component com-
binable with a computer unless it became a "computer-readable
'copy." 85 The Court described two ways in which software can be con-
ceptualized: as abstract instructions "detached from any medium" or al-
ternately as tangible copies of "the instructions encoded on a medium. ''86
Reasoning that a tangible and an intangible thing cannot be combined,
the Court held that software in the abstract, "an idea without physical
embodiment," could not be combined with a computer, a tangible thing.87
The Court also found that the ease with which tangible copies can be
made from abstract instructions does not warrant a different result.88 As
a result, only tangible copies of software qualify as "components" that
can be combined with a tangible computer.89
The Court next determined that "supplying" a component under
§ 271(f) from the United States does not include exporting a master copy
of the component from which further copies can be made. 90 Ginsberg
reasoned that regardless of the ease with which such copies can be pro-
duced from the master copy, copying is "an activity separate and distinct"
from supplying.91 Only supplying the actual components-the tangible
copies of the software-from the United States will create liability for
infringement under § 271(f).92
79. Microsoft Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1750.
80. Id. at 1753.
81. Id. at 1750-51. Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f), it is infringement to supply a party
outside the United States with certain uncombined components from the United States
knowing that the components will be combined by the foreign party in an infringing man-
ner. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2000).
82. Id. at 1753.
83. Id. at 1755.
84. Id. at 1757.
85. Id. at 1754-56.
86. Id. at 1754.
87. Id. at 1755, 1756 n.13.
88. Id. at 1756.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1756-57.
91. Id. (citing AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1372-73 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
(Rader, J., dissenting)).
92. Id. at 1757.
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In finding no liability for Microsoft under § 271(f), the Court pointedly
refused to address two related issues: (1) whether an intangible compo-
nent of an intangible invention can qualify as a section 271(f) compo-
nent-or even if an intangible invention qualifies for a patent;93 and (2)
whether § 271(f) liability exists if the tangible copy of the software is re-
moved from the computer once the software is installed. 94
4. To the Point of Conditional Exhaustion-Quanta Computer, Inc. v.
LG Electronics, Inc.
Just before the 2007 term began, the Supreme Court accepted and
scheduled for argument its next patent case, Quanta Computer, Inc. v.
LG Electronics, Inc., concerning the doctrine of patent exhaustion.95 The
Court held oral argument on January 16, 2008, and a ruling is expected in
late spring or early summer of 2008.96 At issue is the extent to which it is
permissible for a patentee to hold downstream users of a patented article
liable for infringement, where those users obtained the article from an
entity who lawfully obtained the article from the patentee.
Generally, the doctrine of patent exhaustion holds that "an uncondi-
tional sale of a patented device exhausts the patentee's right to control
the purchaser's use of the device thereafter." 97 The facts of the case seem
to complicate the issue, however. LG Electronics, Inc. ("LGE") licensed
its entire patent portfolio to Intel Corporation ("Intel"), which then man-
ufactured microprocessors for use in personal computers. However, in
the license agreement, LGE specified that Intel's customers were not per-
mitted to combine the microprocessors with other, non-Intel parts in a
way that would violate LGE's patents. LGE required Intel to notify its
customers of this license provision, and Intel did so. Despite this warn-
ing, Intel's customers continued to use Intel microprocessors with compo-
nents from other manufacturers, and LGE brought suit alleging
infringement.9 8
The Northern District of California found that, while there was no im-
plied license, Intel's sale of the microprocessors with a license from LGE
exhausted LGE's patent rights against Intel's customers. 99 Although the
Federal Circuit agreed that there could be no implied license because of
the notice provided by Intel, it disagreed with the district court's applica-
93. Id. at 1756 n.13.
94. Id. at 1757 n.14. Justice Alito, in his three-justice concurrence, would have held
that liability ceases once the tangible copy is removed. Id. at 1762.
95. Quanta Computer, Inc., v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 28 (2007) (granting petition
for writ of certiorari).
96. The Supreme Court ruled on June 9, 2008, after this year's Survey period. See
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008).
97. LG Elecs., Inc., v. Bizcom Elecs., Inc., 453 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing
Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. 544, 547 (1873)).
98. See id. at 1368; see also Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass'n, Supreme Court Will
Review Federal Circuit Law on Patent Exhaustion, AIPLA REPORTS, October 1, 2007.
99. See Bizcom Elecs., 453 F.3d at 1370.
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tion of patent exhaustion to Intel's sale.100 Instead, the Circuit found that
Intel's sale was conditional, and thus the exhaustion doctrine did not
apply. 10 1
What constitutes a "conditional sale" lies at the heart of the dispute.
The Federal Circuit relied on Supreme Court precedent in Mitchell v.
Hawley, from 1873, for its "axiomatic" statement of the exhaustion doc-
trine as tied to an unconditional sale.'0 2 However, the Solicitor General
pointed out that the term "unconditional sale" as used in Mitchell, more
narrowly referred to a sale without a condition precedent. 0 3 Also, the
district court based its decision on the Supreme Court's 1942 decision in
United States v. Univis Lens Co., in which a patentee first licensed eye-
glass lens blanks to a manufacturer and then sued the downstream whole-
saler, finishers, and retailers. 10 4 The Federal Circuit did not address the
Univis decision, but instead relied on its own precedent in Mallinckrodt,
Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., which found no exhaustion where there was an ex-
pressly conditional sale or license. 10 5 The Supreme Court granted certio-
rari precisely to review this line of cases.
Also of interest is the applicability of the exhaustion doctrine to
method claims.10 6 Both the district court and the Federal Circuit held
that patent exhaustion did not apply to method claims; 10 7 however, the
Solicitor General cited several Supreme Court patent exhaustion deci-
sions regarding method patents and this may still be an open issue. 10 8
B. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT ON PATENTS
1. A Sea Change in Willfulness-In re Seagate Technology, LLC109
In ruling on a mandamus action seeking protection of work product
and attorney-client privilege, the Federal Circuit changed its twenty-five-
year-old standard for awarding enhanced damages under 35 U.S.C.
§ 284.110 In an infringement action, Seagate countered allegations of will-
ful infringement with an advice-of-counsel defense. 1 ' In doing so, Sea-
100. Id. at 1369-70.
101. Id. at 1370.
102. Id. at 1369 (citing Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. 544, 547 (1873)).
103. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 20-21, Quanta Computer, Inc., v.
LG Elecs., Inc., No. 06-937 (2007).
104. See LG Elecs., Inc. v. Asustek Computer, Inc., 65 U.S.P.Q.2D 1589, 1593-98 (N.D.
Cal. 2002) (analyzing United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 246-51 (1942)).
105. See Bizcom Elecs., 453 F.3d at 1369-70 (citing Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc.
976 F.2d 700, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
106. See Mark R. Paterson, Reestablishing the Doctrine of Patent Exhaustion, 2007 Pa-
tently-O Patent L.J. 38, 41, http://www.patentlyo.com/lawjournal.
107. LG Elecs., 453 F.3d at 1370.
108. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 25-26, Quanta Computer, Inc., v.
LG Elecs., Inc., No. 06-937 (2007); see also Eric W. Hagen, Another Term, Another High-
Stakes Patent Case, IPLaw360, PORTFOLIO MEDIA, Oct. 24, 2007.
109. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
110. Id. at 1365; see 35 U.S.C. 284 (2000).
111. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1366. The court defines the advice-of-counsel defense as the
accused infringer attempting to "establish that due to reasonable reliance on advice from
counsel, its continued accused activities were done in good faith." Id. at 1369.
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gate waived attorney-client privilege and protection of work product
relating to the subject matter of opinion counsel's advice.' 12 The district
court held that the waiver extended to all counsel and ordered production
of related documents and testimony of trial counsel.1 1 3 Seagate argued
that the waiver did not extend to trial counsel and after being denied an
interlocutory appeal, petitioned the Federal Circuit for a writ of manda-
mus. 1 14 In holding that waiver did not extend to trial counsel, the en banc
court overruled its long standing affirmative-duty-of-care standard for
willful infringement in favor of an objective recklessness standard.1 15
In Seagate, the court announced that the patentee now bears the bur-
den and must show that the infringer willfully infringed in order to re-
ceive enhanced damages for willful infringement. 1 6 Generally, if a
district court finds willful infringement, it may award up to three times
the amount of actual infringement damages. 117 Reasoning that "willful-
ness" in the context of patent infringement should have the same mean-
ing as in analogous violations of law, the court overruled its affirmative-
duty-of-care standard 18 and held that to prove willfulness a patentee
must establish by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) the infringer's
actions had an "objectively high likelihood" of infringing a valid patent;
and (2) the infringer knew, or should have known, of this high risk of
infringement.119
In addition to revising the willfulness standard, the Federal Circuit
made two further rulings of interest. First, the court concluded that,
while a party waives attorney-client privilege when it raises the advice-of-
counsel defense, the scope of the waiver does not normally extend to
communications with trial counsel or trial counsel's work product. 120
Second, the court observed that the proper legal deterrent for reckless,
post-filing, willful infringement is generally a preliminary injunction, not
enhanced damages.' 2'
2. Rub a Dub Dub, Three Men in a... Machine, Manufacture, or
Composition of Matter-In re Bilski, In re Comiskey,
& In re Nuijten
In 2006, the Supreme Court first granted certiorari to consider whether
a method of using a scientific principle was patentable subject matter in
112. Id. at 1370.
113. Id. at 1366-67.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1371.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1368 n.3 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000)); id. at 1368 (citing Beatrice Foods Co.
v. New England Printing & Lithographing Co., 923 F.2d 1576, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
118. Early in its history, the Federal Circuit established that a party having "actual no-
tice of another's patent rights ... has an affirmative duty" of care in determining whether it
is infringing the patent. Id. (quoting Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co.,
717 F.2d 1380, 1389-90 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
119. Id. at 1370-71.
120. Id. at 1374.
121. Id. at 1374, 1376.
20081
SMU LAW REVIEW
the case of Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite, Inc., but
dismissed it as improvidently granted. 122 Writing for a three-justice dis-
sent, Justice Breyer favored hearing the case and finding that the claimed
invention was unpatentable subject matter.12 3 Breyer noted that the law
excludes "laws of nature, natural phenomenon, and abstract ideas" from
patent protection because "sometimes too much patent protection can
impede rather than 'promote the Progress of Science and the useful
Arts."1 24 According to Breyer, a decision from the Court "would help
diminish legal uncertainty in the area" and "could contribute to the im-
portant ongoing debate, among both specialists and generalists, as to
whether the patent system, as currently administered and enforced, ade-
quately reflects the 'careful balance' that 'the federal patent laws . ..
embod[y].' "125
Perhaps corresponding to the Supreme Court's interest, the Federal
Circuit has also shown an interest in better defining, and potentially con-
tracting, the scope of patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. In
a single day, the Circuit ruled, in In re Nuijten, that a physical but transi-
tory signal did not qualify as one of the four statutory categories of pat-
entable matter126 and, in In re Comiskey, that a mental process is not
patentable unless it has a practical application, and the process involves
"another class of statutory matter. ' 12 7 Two weeks later, in In re Bilski, a
panel of the court heard oral argument in an appeal of another rejected
method claim, and within five months, the court granted an en banc hear-
ing sua sponte 28 to consider what constitutes a patentable "process."'1 2 9
In Nuitjen, the court determined that Nuitjen's invention directed to "a
signal with embedded supplemental data" was not patentable subject
matter.13o The court reasoned that although the claimed signal was nec-
essarily physical, it was not a "process, machine, manufacture, or compo-
sition of matter" and therefore not patentable.' 3 ' The court first
explained that its decision in State Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Finan-
cial Group, Inc. did not stand for the proposition that certain subject mat-
ter may be patentable without falling into one of the statutory categories,
but only that the actual category it falls into is irrelevant. 132 Next, the
122. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs, Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 125 (2006) (per
curiam). The patent at issue claimed a method of correlating high levels of a specific
amino acid in the blood with a vitamin deficiency. Id. at 129.
123. Id. at 126, 138.
124. Id. at 126 (internal citations omitted).
125. Id. at 138 (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141
(1989)).
126. In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
127. In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
128. In re Bilski, 264 F. App'x 896, 897 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Ex Parte Bilski, Appeal 2002-
2257, 2006 WL 4080055, at *1 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 26, 2006).
129. See Bilski, 264 F. App'x at 897.
130. Nuitjen, 500 F.3d at 1351.
131. Id. at 1351-53, 1357 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000)).
132. Id. at 1354 (citing State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149
F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
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court reasoned that the claimed signal in Nuilten was not an "act or a
series of acts" and thus, it was not a "process."'1 33 The court also ex-
plained that the signal did not "possess concrete structure" consisting of
mechanical devices or parts and, therefore, it was not a "machine. 1 34 In
addition, the court found that the claimed signal was not a "manufacture"
because the signal is not a "tangible article[ ] or commodit[y]."' 135 Finally,
as the signal is not "a chemical union, nor a gas, fluid, powder, or solid,"
the court found that it did not qualify as a "composition of matter."'136
In Comiskey, Comiskey's invention directed to "a 'method for
mandatory arbitration resolution regarding one or more ... documents"'
was held unpatentable because it operates on "human intelligence
alone. 1 3 7 The court first determined that an abstract idea or algorithm
must have a practical application to qualify as patentable subject mat-
ter.' 38 Next, the court explained that an abstract idea or algorithm em-
bodied in a process is patentable only if the process "operates on,
transforms, or otherwise involves... a machine, manufacture, or compo-
sition of matter. '139 Thus, the court established that having a practical
application alone is insufficient to render a mental process-an abstract
idea-as patentable subject matter.140
Further, the Circuit addressed the potential obviousness of creating a
machine to embody a mental process. It held that "[t]he routine addition
of modern electronics to an otherwise unpatentable invention typically
creates a prima facie case of obviousness.' 41 Thus, a court may consider
secondary evidence of nonobviousness stemming solely from the mental
process as irrelevant. 42 The court remanded the case to the Patent and
Trademark Office ("PTO") to determine "whether the addition of mod-
ern computers and communications devices would have been
obvious.'1 43
In Bilski, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences determined
that Bilski's invention directed to a commodities hedging method did not
qualify as a patentable process under 35 U.S.C. § 101.144 The Board first
rejected the method as a § 101 process because it did not "transform any
physical subject matter."'1 45 In addition, the Board rejected the method
133. Id. at 1355.
134. Id. at 1355-56.
135. Id. at 1356-57.
136. Id. at 1357.
137. In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1368-69, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
138. Id. at 1376.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1377.
141. Id. at 1380.
142. Id. (stating that a "long-felt need for the unpatentable mental process itself" is not
pertinent evidence).
143. Id. at 1381.
144. Ex Parte Bilski Appeal 2002-2257, 2006 WL 4080055, at *2 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 26,
2006).
145. Id. at *18 (defining "physical subject matter" as "matter or some form of energy").
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because it was an abstract idea.146 Finally, although the Board inter-
preted the "useful, concrete and tangible result" test of State Street and
AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc. to be limited to processes
that transform data by a machine, the Board nevertheless invoked that
test "to the extent that State Street applies to non-machine-implemented
process claims" to reject the hedging method. 147 On appeal to the Fed-
eral Circuit, the PTO welcomed increased clarity on the patentability of
business concepts that do not involve a transformation of data.148 The
court, sua sponte, granted an en banc hearing to address the issues:
(1) Whether claim 1 of the 08/833,892 patent application claims pat-
ent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101?
(2) What standard should govern in determining whether a process
is patent-eligible subject matter under [§] 101?
(3) Whether the claimed subject matter is not patent-eligible be-
cause it constitutes an abstract idea or mental process; when does a
claim that contains both mental and physical steps create patent-eli-
gible subject matter?
(4) Whether a method or process must result in a physical transfor-
mation of an article or be tied to a machine to be patent-eligible
subject matter under [§] 101?
(5) Whether it is appropriate to reconsider State Street Bank & Trust
Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed .Cir.1998),
and AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., 172 F .3d 1352
(Fed.Cir.1999), in this case and, if so, whether those cases should be
overruled in any respect?14
9
Oral arguments in Bilski occurred on May 8, 2008. However no decision
has been rendered to date. 1
50
3. Designs of Bottled Saints and Buffered Goddesses-Arminak &
Associates, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Calmar, Inc. and Egyptian
Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc.
Under Federal Circuit jurisprudence, determination of infringement of
a design patent under 35 U.S.C. § 289 involves first construing the patent
claim and then comparing the construed claim to the accused design.
151
Infringement exists if: (1) the designs are so similar that an ordinary ob-
server would be deceived into purchasing the accused design believing it
to be the patented design (the ordinary-observer test); and (2) "the ac-
146. Id. at *20-21.
147. Id. at *2, *21-22 (citing AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) and State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed.
Cir. 1998))
148. Brief for Appellee Director of the U.S.P.T.O at 4, In re Bilski, No. 2007-1130 (Fed.
Cir. Feb. 15, 2008).
149. In re Bilski, 264 F. App'x 896, 897 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
150. A recording of the oral arguments may be found on the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals website. Oral Argument, http://www.oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/search-
script.asp (enter Case No. 2007-1130, hit search, and select recordings from May 8, 2008).
151. See Arminak & Assocs., Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Calmar, Inc., 501 F.3d 1314, 1319-20
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2000)).
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cused design appropriated the novelty which distinguishes the patented
design from the prior art" (the point-of-novelty test) 1 52
The Federal Circuit has also expressed an interest in clarifying what
constitutes infringement of a design patent under 35 U.S.C. § 289. First,
in detailing its ordinary-observer test for assessing infringement of a de-
sign patent, the court held that the "ordinary observer" with respect to a
component of an end product is the purchaser of the component, rather
than the purchaser of the end product.1 53 Later, the court granted an en
banc rehearing of a noninfringement holding to consider its point-of-nov-
elty test. 154
In Arminak & Associates, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Calmar, Inc., the Fed-
eral Circuit found that patents that claimed ornamental designs for a trig-
ger sprayer were not infringed because the ordinary observer-the
purchaser of the trigger sprayer-would not be deceived by the design. 155
Calmar and Arminak both sell trigger sprayers to manufacturers of liquid
household products, who in turn incorporate the sprayer in the final retail
product. 156 The district court held that since the industrial purchaser who
purchased the sprayers for the household products manufacturer would
not be deceived by the similarity of Armanak's design to Calmar's pat-
ented design, Arminak did not infringe Calmar's patent.157 In affirming
the district court, the Federal Circuit agreed that the proper "ordinary
observer" in such an infringement analysis is the industrial purchaser of
the component, rather than the retail purchaser of the finished
product.1 58
In Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., a Federal Circuit panel first
held that the patented shape of a fingernail buffer was not infringed be-
cause the claimed point of novelty-a combination of prior-art ele-
ments-was not a nontrivial advance over the prior art.159 The panel
stated that the point-of-novelty test can be satisfied by a combination of
individually known prior-art elements only if the combination is a "non-
trivial advance over the prior art."1 60 The panel then noted that the in-
fringement and validity analyses for design patents are often conflated
and determined that, in the context of a combination of prior art ele-
ments in the point-of-novelty test, an obviousness-style nontriviality test
is more appropriate than an anticipation test.161
Egyptian Goddess, the patentee, successfully petitioned for an en banc
152. Id. at 1320.
153. Id. at 1323.
154. Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 256 F. App'x 357, 357 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
155. Arminak & Assocs., 501 F.3d at 1318.
156. See id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1323.
159. Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 498 F.3d 1354, 1355-56, 1358 (Fed. Cir.
2007), vacated, 256 F. App'x 357 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
160. Id. at 1357.
161. Id. at 1358 n.3.
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rehearing.1 62 In granting the rehearing, the Federal Circuit vacated its
earlier decision and stated the issues to be addressed as:
1) Should "point of novelty" be a test for infringement [sic] of design
patent?
2) If so, (a) should the court adopt the nontrivial advance test
adopted by the panel majority in this case; (b) should the point of
novelty test be part of the patentee's burden on infringement or
should it be an available defense; (c) should a design patentee, in
defining a point of novelty, be permitted to divide closely related or
ornamentally integrated features of the patented design to match
features contained in an accused design; (d) should it be permissible
to find more than one "point of novelty" in a patented design; and
(e) should the overall appearance of a design be permitted to be a
point of novelty? See Lawman Armor Corp. v. Winner Int'l, LLC,
449 F.3d 1190 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
3) Should claim construction apply to design patents, and, if so, what
role should that construction play in the infringement analysis? See
Elmer v. ICC Fabricating, Inc., 67 F.3d 1571, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1995).163
4. Keeping Paice with the Courts-Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp.
The Supreme Court's ruling in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L. C. left
district courts to fashion new relief, other than an injunction, in patent
cases involving continuing infringement after an injunction has been de-
nied.164 In Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., the Federal Circuit deter-
mined that a district court may award an ongoing royalty and the judge
may determine the royalty rate.16
5
Within months of the eBay decision, the Eastern District of Texas de-
cided a case involving a non-practicing patentee, Paice, asserting its pat-
ent rights against Toyota. 166 The trial court held that Toyota infringed
Paice's patents but that a permanent injunction was not appropriate
under eBay.167 The court did, however, award damages for future acts of
infringement in the form of an ongoing royalty at a rate determined by
the court and to be in effect for the life of the patent. 168 Toyota appealed
the infringement holding and Paice appealed the imposition of the ongo-
ing royalty. 169
After affirming on infringement, the Federal Circuit determined that
the district court had the authority, under 35 U.S.C. § 283, to declare
Toyota's continuing infringement permissible in exchange for a court-im-
162. Egyptian Goddess, 256 F. App'x at 357.
163. Id. at 357-58.
164. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006) (requiring a pat-
entee to satisfy the generally applicable four-factor test to qualify for a permanent injunc-
tion from continued patent infringement).
165. Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1314-15 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
166. Id. at 1302-03.
167. Id. at 1303.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1296.
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posed ongoing royalty.170 In finding the statutory authority, the appellate
court noted that it has upheld such damages without "dispute as to the
district court's authority to craft such a remedy"171 and that, in the con-
text of antitrust violations, the Supreme Court has approved such
remedies. 172
Although the court has the authority to award ongoing royalties, they
are not to be awarded as a matter of course when an injunction is de-
nied. 173 The district court "may wish to allow the parties to negotiate a
license ... before imposing an ongoing royalty."' 74 Further, in remand-
ing on the issue of the ongoing royalty rate, the Federal Circuit noted that
the district court did not provide sufficient reasons for the royalty to per-
mit a meaningful review for abuse of discretion.' 75
The Federal Circuit then held that the patentee did not have a Seventh
Amendment right to have a jury determine the ongoing royalty rate. 176
While conceding that there may be a Constitutional right to a jury trial to
determine damages, the Court reasoned that "not all monetary relief is
properly characterized as 'damages"' and that "the fact that monetary
relief is at issue ...does not, standing alone, warrant a jury trial."'1 77
Paice's assertions that the royalty constituted damages to be determined
by a jury were insufficient to demonstrate that it had a Seventh Amend-
ment right to a jury trial on the amount of the ongoing royalty.178
C. No Go FOR THE PTO-TAFAS V. DUDAS
In January 2006, the PTO proposed rule changes regarding continuing-
application, continued-examination, and claim-examination practice be-
cause PTO claimed it was overburdened with the number and complexity
of applications. 179 Under the proposed rules, applicants would be limited
to two continuation or continuation-in-part (CIP) applications and one
request for continued examination (RCE) per initial application.'80 With
the proper showing of cause (or without, if justice requires) an applicant
may be granted a third continuation or CIP, or a second RCE. l8 1 Fur-
ther, where the application contains in excess of five independent claims
or twenty-five total claims, the proposed rules also require submission of
170. Id. at 1314-15 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2000)).
171. Id. at 1314 (citing Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 758 F.2d
613, 628 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
172. Id. (citing United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 410 U.S. 52, 59 (1973)).
173. Id. at 1314-15.
174. Id. Judge Rader argued that a district court must first allow the parties to negoti-
ate a license or obtain their permission prior to setting the rate. Id. at 1316 (Rader, J.,
concurring).




179. Tafas v. Dudas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805, 808 (E.D. Va. 2008).
180. Id. at 809. Current rules do not limit the number of continuation or CIP applica-




information on each claim to assist the examiner in determining patenta-
bility. 182 Other proposed changes eliminate voluntary divisional applica-
tions and CIPs stemming from divisional applications. 1
83
In separate actions, Triantafyllos Tafas and GlaxoSmithKline sued
under the Administrative Procedure Act seeking to permanently enjoin
the PTO from enacting the proposed rules. 184 The plaintiffs claimed that
the proposed rules constitute unlawful agency action.185 The Eastern
District of Virginia consolidated the cases and found for the plaintiffs.
186
The court held that the PTO did not have the authority to promulgate
the proposed rules and granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judg-
ment seeking a permanent injunction against the PTO's enactment of the
proposed rules.1 87 The court first interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2) and de-
termined that Congress had not granted the PTO the authority to issue
substantive rules or to make substantive interpretations of the Patent
Act.18 8 Under prevailing law, applicants had a right to file an unlimited
number of continuations. 189 Noting that the proposed rules represent a
"drastic departure" from the current understanding of the Patent Act, the
court held that the proposed rules affect existing individual rights and,
thus, the rules are substantive.1 90 Also the court explained that under
prevailing law, the PTO bears the burden of examination, and the pro-
posed rule would place this burden on the applicant by requiring the ap-
plicant to search prior art and provide reasons for patentability.' 9'
D. How DID WE END Up HERE?-IN RE VOLKSWAGEN
OF AMERICA, INC.
While In re Volkswagen of America, Inc. 192 does not involve a patent or
even an intellectual property right, the Fifth Circuit's decision in has the
potential to significantly impact patent litigation. The Fifth Circuit over-
turned the venue decision by the Eastern District of Texas, a forum which
has become a leading venue for patent litigation in the United States.193
The Volkswagen case involves a product liability claim resulting from the
rear-end collision of a Volkswagen Golf causing a girl's death.194 The
Marshall Division of the Eastern District of Texas denied Volkswagen's
182. Id. at 810. Current rules do not require such a submission. Id. at 816.
183. Id. Current rules allow for voluntary divisional applications and for CIPs from
divisional applications.
184. Id. at 808.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 807.
187. Id. at 817.
188. Id. at 811 (interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2) (2000)).
189. Id. at 814 (including CIPs and RCEs).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 816.
192. 506 F.3d 376 (5th Cir. 2007).
193. Dave Moore, IP Cases Head East, DALLAS BUSINESS JOURNAL, Feb. 22, 2008,
http://dallas.bizjournals.com/dallas/stories/2008/02/25/focusl.html.
194. In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 506 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2007).
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motion to transfer to the Dallas Division of the Northern District of
Texas despite the following facts:
(1) the Volkswagen Golf was purchased in Dallas County, Texas; (2)
the accident occurred on a freeway in Dallas, Texas; (3) Dallas re-
sidents witnessed the accident; (4) Dallas police and paramedics re-
sponded and took action; (5) a Dallas doctor performed the autopsy;
(6) the third-party defendant lives in Dallas County, Texas; (7) none
of the plaintiffs live in the Marshall Division; (8) no known party or
significant non-party witness lives in the Marshall Division; and (9)
none of the facts giving rise to this suit occurred in the Marshall
Division.195
The Fifth Circuit first found that the district court incorrectly applied
the standard for forum non conveniens to Volkswagen's motion to trans-
fer venue. 196 However, the Fifth Circuit recognized the reason for this
error finding that its "precedents have not been the model of clarity,"
especially since the panel itself struggled to find a precedential case on
point. 197 The Fifth Circuit eventually concluded that the "moving party
must demonstrate that a transfer is '[flor the convenience of parties and
witnesses, in the interest of justice.' '"198 Significantly, the Fifth Circuit
reasoned that the deference for the plaintiff's choice of forum establishes
this burden on the moving party thereby implying that the plaintiff's
choice is not the only consideration.' 99
The Fifth Circuit next addressed the district court's evaluation of the
public and private interest.200 First, in an early footnote, the Fifth Circuit
acknowledged a general issue with venue determinations, stating, "failure
to follow with some precision the test we have set out necessarily pro-
duces inconsistent results in [the Fifth] Circuit. Absent exceptional cir-
cumstances, the district courts of the Fifth Circuit must consider motions
to transfer under the rubric we have provided."'201
The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court on its evaluation of three of
the four private interest factors and the only contested public interest
factor.20 2 Two of these factors are of particular interest here. First, for
the private interest factor that evaluated the cost of attendance for willing
witnesses, the Fifth Circuit disputed the district court's determination that
"Volkswagen did not submit sufficient information for the court to deter-
mine which of its witnesses were 'key."' 203 Instead, the Fifth Circuit dis-
cussed several witnesses and concluded, "these witnesses [appeared to
195. Id. at 378-79.
196. Id. at 380.
197. Id. at 384.
198. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
199. Id. Note that Fifth Circuit did not address the plaintiff's choice of forum in its
evaluation of the venue determination apart from its discussion where the burden of proof
lies.
200. See id. at 384-87.
201. Id. at 380 n.1.
202. Id. at 384-87.
203. Id. at 385.
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be] important to Volkswagen's case."' 20 4 It then ruled that the district
court should not have ignored Fifth Circuit precedent establishing a 100-
mile threshold rule for evaluating inconvenience, especially after the dis-
trict court specifically recognized that Marshall is 155 miles from
Dallas.20 5
Second, the Fifth Circuit criticized the district court's evaluation of the
public interest factor recognizing "the local interest in having localized
interests decided at home. °20 6 The Fifth Circuit observed that the district
court's findings that the factor weighed against transfer "[stood] in stark
contrast to [its] analysis in" prior caselaw, where "under virtually undist-
inguishable facts, [the court] held that this factor weighed heavily in favor
of transfer. ' 20 7 The district court reasoned that, "although the accident
occurred in the Dallas Division, the citizens of Marshall would be inter-
ested to know whether there are defective products offered for sale in...
the Marshall Division and whether they are being exposed to these prod-
ucts."'20 8 Observing that "there is no relevant factual connection to the
Marshall Division," the Fifth Circuit then explained the error in the dis-
trict court's analysis:
The district court's provided rationales ... stretch logic in a manner
that eviscerates the public interest that this factor attempts to cap-
ture. The district court's provided rationales could apply to virtually
any judicial district and division in the United States; they leave no
room for consideration of those actually affected-directly and indi-
rectly-by the controversies and events giving rise to a case. Thus, the
district court committed a clear abuse of discretion.20 9
Interestingly, the Fifth Circuit's treatment of these issues has not been
finalized since the Court has decided to have an en banc rehearing. 210 In
addition, the question of whether this abuse of discretion analysis will
apply to patent cases before the Federal Circuit still remains.
III. TRADEMARK UPDATE
A. FAILURE TO READ "THE SIGN" MAY CAUSE HURLEY-
HURLEY INTERNATIONAL LLC v. VOLTA
The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (the "TIAB") further ex-
panded the scope of its line of cases following Medinol Ltd. v. Neuro
Vasx, Inc.211 when it voided the applicants' pending use-based trademark
application in Hurley International LLC v. Volta.212 In 2003 its decision
in Medinol Ltd. v. Neuro Vasx, Inc., the TTAB cancelled a registration
204. Id. at 386.
205. Id. at 385-86.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 387 (referencing In re Volkswagen AG, 371 F.3d 201 (5th Cir. 2004)).
208. Id. at 386.
209. Id. at 387.
210. In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 517 F.3d 785 (5th Cir. 2008).
211. 67 U.S.P.Q.2d 1205, 2003 TTAB LEXIS 227 (T.T.A.B. 2003).
212. 82 U.S.P.Q.2d 1339, 2007 TrAB LEXIS 10 (T.T.A.B. 2007).
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due to the owner's fraud in filing an Amendment to Allege Use which
claimed that the mark was in use in connection with all goods listed in the
application, when in fact it was not.
2 13
Here, Paul and Jane Volta (collectively, the "Voltas"), Australian musi-
cians, sought to register the mark THE SIGN along with an accompany-
ing design. 214 Roughly a year after filing the application under section
1(a) of the Lanham Act, it was published for opposition.215 Hurley Inter-
national, LLC opposed the mark in part because of fraud, and eventually
moved for summary judgment based on the Voltas' alleged admission
that (1) with regard to some services listed in their application, they had
not used the mark in commerce within the United States, and (2) with
regard to a further subset of services, they had not used the mark any-
where in the world.2 16
The TTAB agreed and found fraud, voiding the Voltas' entire applica-
tion.217 The Board reiterated that "[fIraud in procuring a trademark re-
gistration occurs when an applicant for registration knowingly makes
false, material representations of fact in connection with an application to
register.1218 Here, not only did the Voltas falsely claim to be using the
mark in connection with certain services, but also they twice submitted
substitute specimens accompanied by signed declarations that again
falsely claimed that the mark was used in commerce in connection with
all listed services. 219
The applicants pleaded "ignorance and misunderstanding of the pro-
cess of the Trademark Office," noting that they represented themselves
and that they had believed "use in commerce" encompassed use in Aus-
tralia and on their website. 220 They also noted that Paul Volta suffered "a
major coronary infarct" while the application was pending.2 21
The TTAB found the applicants' misunderstanding irrelevant. The
TTAB looked to objective indications of intent, rather than the appli-
cants' subjective intent, citing Medinol.222 It also found their alleged con-
fusion regarding the meaning of "use in commerce" to be
unreasonable. 223 Finally, and most significantly, TJAB found that it
made no difference that the registration of the mark had not yet
issued. 224
Significantly, after this decision, pending applications, like issued regis-
trations, can be successfully opposed due to fraud for misstatements con-
213. Medinol, Ltd., 2003 TTAB LEXIS 227, at *18.
214. Hurley Int'l, 2007 TTAB LEXIS 10, at *1.
215. Id.; Lanham Act § 1(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a) (2006).
216. Hurley Int'l, 2007 TTAB LEXIS 10, at *19.
217. Id. at *25.
218. Id. at *15.
219. Id. at *2.
220. Id. at *10-12.
221. Id. at *12.
222. Id. at *21-22 (internal citations omitted).
223. Id. at *22.
224. Id. at *17-18.
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cerning use. The Board reasoned that, regardless of timing of
misrepresentations, "the result is the same-an application results in a
registration improperly accorded legal presumptions in connection with
goods and/or services on which the mark is not used. '225
However, the Board noted that the publication of the application was
still significant.2 26 In footnote five the TTrAB remarked in dicta that "a
misstatement ... does not rise to the level of fraud where an applicant
amends the application prior to publication. 2 27
B. CASE OF COUTURE FOR THE DoGs-Louis VUITTON MALLETIER
S.A. v. HA UTE DIGGITY Doc, LLC
In 2006, Congress passed the Trademark Dilution Revision Act
("TDRA"). 228 Trademark dilution is distinct from traditional trademark
infringement, because it focuses on protecting a mark's significance or
meaning, whereas the latter focuses on preventing consumer confu-
sion.229 The TDRA had two distinct effects. First, it established the stan-
dard for infringement as likelihood of confusion, rather than actual
confusion, overruling the Supreme Court's decision in Moseley v. V Secret
Catalogue, Inc. 230 Second, the TDRA outlined two distinct dilution
causes of action: dilution by blurring and dilution by tarnishment.231
The Fourth Circuit's opinion in Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute
Diggity Dog, LLC is one of the first appellate decisions addressing trade-
mark dilution under the TDRA.232 Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A.
("LVM") is a French corporation that designs and manufactures luxury
luggage and handbags. 233 Haute Diggity Dog makes plush chew toys for
dogs which resemble luxury products and play on the products' names,
such as Furcedes (Mercedes), Dog Perignonn (Dom Perignon), and
Chewie Vuiton (Louis Vuitton), the last of which resulted in LVM's suit
for trademark infringement.2 34 Specifically, Haute Diggity Dog made a
plush chew toy shaped like a handbag that resembled a LVM handbag
and retailed for $1,190.235
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judg-
ment dismissing all claims, first addressing traditional trademark infringe-
ment claims and then claims of dilution under the TDRA.2 36 As part of
225. Id. at *18.
226. Id. at *18 n.5.
227. Id. at *18 n.5 (citing Universal Overall Co. v. Stonecutter Mills Corp., 154 U.S.P.Q.
104 (C.C.P.A. 1967)).
228. See David L. McCombs, et al., Intellectual Property Law, 60 SMU L. REV. 1141,
1162-63 (2007).
229. Id. at 1162.
230. Id.; see also Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
231. McCombs, supra note 227, at 1161.
232. See Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252 (4th
Cir. 2007).
233. Id. at 256.
234. Id. at 258.
235. Id. at 257.
236. Id. at 256, 258, 263-64.
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its infringement analysis, the Fourth Circuit found that the Haute Diggity
Dog plush chew toy was a parody of the LVM handbag. 237 The chew toy
used a similar sounding name, a repetitious design that imitates the de-
sign on the handbag, and a "CV" mark similar to LVM's "LV" mark;
however, the court found that the product would not be confused with
the actual LVM handbag.
238
For its dilution analysis, the Fourth Circuit performed a more rigorous
analysis than the district court, but reached the same result. Regarding
blurring, the court first made clear that a parody would not be an auto-
matic, complete defense, and found that the Haute Diggity Dog parody
did not fall under the explicit fair use exception in the TDRA.239 That
exception was limited to "any fair use ... other than as a designation of
source for the person's own good or services, including use in connection
with... parodying. ' '240 However, even outside this exception, the defen-
dant's use of parody was relevant to the evaluation of the six statutory
factors. 241 The court evaluated each of these factors, finding repeatedly
that the use of the parody tended to both enhance the asserted famous
mark's distinctiveness by stressing the differences between the parody
and the famous mark.2 42 The court did make the important distinction
that this would not be the case if the parody could be confused for the
famous mark itself, citing the examples of "DUPONT shoes, BUICK as-
pirin, and KODAK pianos" used by the Supreme Court in Moseley.
243
The Fourth Circuit's discussion regarding tarnishment was less elabo-
rate.244 LVM had only asserted one possible theory by which tarnishment
would occur, and the court found there was no record to support the the-
ory.2 45 All remaining infringement theories followed the analyses the
Fourth Circuit had already discussed, and the court affirmed the district
court's dismissal of all of LVM's claims.2 46
C. TAG, YOU'RE IT! . . . IN A META SORTA WAY: J.G. WENTWORTH,
S.S.C. LTD. V. SETTLEMENT FUNDING LLC
Whether the use of trademarks as keywords in pay-for-placement in-
ternet searches or as meta tags in website hypertext markup language
("HTML") code can constitute trademark infringement under the Lan-
ham Act has become an issue of some debate. 247 Search engine opera-
237. Id. at 260.
238. Id. at 260-61.
239. Id. at 266.
240. Id. at 266 (emphasis added in court's opinion) (citing 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125 (a)(ii)
(West 2006)).
241. Id. at 267.
242. Id. at 267-68.
243. Id. at 268 (citing Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 431 (2003)).
244. Id.
245. Id. at 268-69.
246. Id. at 256-57, 270.




tors, such as Google, Inc., who sell trademarks as keywords have been a
target in these cases. 248 Similarly, advertisers who pay a search engine
operator to return links to the advertiser's website as a result of searches
for a competitor's trademark have also been targeted.2 4 9 Courts are split
as to whether such use of a trademark is "use in commerce" as required
by the Lanham Act.2 50 Some courts hold that because the trademark is
never communicated to the public, it is analogous to an "individual's pri-
vate thoughts" and thereby is not a use in commerce. 251
In J.G. Wentworth, S.S.C. Ltd. P'ship v. Settlement Funding LLC, an
infringement action against an advertiser, the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania recently introduced a novel twist to this debate. 252 In granting
the defendant's motion to dismiss the infringement action, the J.G.
Wentworth court held that while the advertiser's use of the trademarks as
keywords in the pay-for-placement search engine or meta tags in the web-
site's source code was "use in commerce," such use does not create a
likelihood of confusion.2 53
The defendant, Settlement Funding LLC ("SF"), used the plaintiff's
trademarks, "J.G. Wentworth" and "JG Wentworth," as keywords in
Google's AdWords program and as keyword meta tags in the HTML
code for SF's website. 25 4 As AdWord keywords, the marks, when en-
tered as search terms in Google's search engine, trigger Google's pro-
gram to display a link to SF's website in Google's "Sponsored Link"
section of the search results page.255 As keyword meta tags, the marks,
when entered as search terms in various Internet search engines, may
trigger the engine to create a link to SF's website along with other stan-
dard results. 25 6
Although SF's use of the trademarks left the marks invisible to poten-
tial consumers, its use was still "use" under the Lanham Act.2 57 In reach-
ing this conclusion, the court reasoned that the sponsored ads and search
results established "an opportunity to reach consumers" and is thus un-
like "an individual's private thoughts. '258 Such use had "crossed the line
from internal use to use in commerce under the Lanham Act." 259
The court nevertheless held that, as a matter of law, SF had not in-
248. Id.
249. Id. at 397.
250. Id. at 399-400.
251. See, e.g., Merck & Co., Inc. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d
402,415 (S.D.N.Y. (2006)) (quoting 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400,
409 (2d Cir. 2005)).
252. J.G. Wentworth, S.S.C. Ltd. P'ship v. Settlement Funding, LLC, 85 U.S. P.Q.2d
1780 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
253. Id. at 1785-86.
254. Id. at 1782.
255. Id.
256. Id.





fringed J.G. Wentworth's trademarks. 2 60 Because the search engine and
AdWord links to SF's website do not display the trademarks, there is no
likelihood of confusion. 26 1 Noting that search engines do not take a po-
tential customer to the linked website but rather to a search results page,
the court refused to extend initial confusion protection to include In-
ternet keywords.2 62 Because the search engine and AdWord links to SF's
website are "independent and distinct" of the other search-returned links,
"potential consumers have no opportunity to confuse defendant's ser-
vices, goods, advertisements, links or websites for those of [the] plaintiff"
and so, "no reasonable factfinder could find a likelihood of confusion"
created by SF's use of the trademarks.
263
IV. COPYRIGHT UPDATE
A. Two ATTEMPTS AT PERFECT'S RESULT-PERFECT 10, INC.
v. AMAZON.COM, INC.
2 64
Internet search engines have become the table of contents for the mass
of information and media available on the Internet. The manner in which
this "table of contents" is created, organized, and displayed has led to a
variety of disputes as parties and courts attempt to apply long-established
intellectual property principles to novel uses of protected material. In
2006, the Central District of California entered a preliminary injunction
against Google, Inc. ("Google"), after finding that plaintiff Perfect 10,
Inc. ("Perfect 10") demonstrated a likelihood of success in its claim of
copyright infringement. 2
65
Google operates an Internet search engine, which automatically ac-
cesses and indexes numerous Internet websites. 266 In response to a query
entered at Google's own website, a user may obtain an index of relevant
websites tailored to his query.267 A user utilizing Google's website may
search for both text and images. 268 In response to a query for images,
Google's site may return not only links to relevant websites, but also min-
iaturized images, so that the user may browse the images before deter-
mining which sites to visit.269 This is where Google's difficulties with
Perfect 10 begin.
260. Id. at 1786.
261. Id.
262. Id. (disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit's understanding of the function of a search
engine in Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir.
1999)).
263. Id.
264. 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). While Amazon.com, Inc. is the first named
defendant, Google and its search engine were the primary focus of both the district court's
injunction and the Ninth Circuit opinion.
265. Id. at 1154.
266. Id. at 1155.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 1155-56.
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Perfect 10 owns rights to and sells images of models that were appear-
ing on Google's website as part of the index resulting from user image
queries.2 70 Perfect 10 alleged that Google's image indexes infringed its
copyright in these images in several ways.271 First, Google's search en-
gine created smaller, lower resolution "thumbnail" copies of the images it
indexed. Also, Google would display the full size image in the user's
browser by embedding a reference to the indexed website's image within
Google's page. This way, users of Google's website were able to view an
image located on another website without leaving Google's website. Fi-
nally, many of the websites referenced by Google's image index were
themselves in violation of Perfect 10's copyright. 272
Although the Ninth Circuit commended the district court's treatment
of the issues, 273 while also choosing to amend its own opinion, 274 the
Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's injunction and remanded the
case for further factual findings.275 Agreeing with the "server test" used
by the district court, the Ninth Circuit found that the "thumbnail" images
utilized by Google infringed Perfect 10's copyright, while the embedded
references used to display the full-sized images did not.276 This was be-
cause the "thumbnail" was a copy of the copyrighted image stored on and
displayed from Google's server, whereas Google made no copy of the
full-sized images, but instead utilized the embedded reference to fetch the
image from the server on which it resided.277
Having determined that the "thumbnail" images infringed Perfect 10's
copyright, the Ninth Circuit next assessed Google's fair use defense and
overturned the district court's assessment, relying heavily on its previous
decision in Kelly v. Ariba Soft Corp.278 The Ninth Circuit found that the
first fair use factor, the purpose and character of the use, heavily favored
Google rather than Perfect 10.279 The court found that Google's use of
thumbnail images to create an index of images was "highly transforma-
tive" and provided "public benefit," which outweighed the commercial
nature of the use and the potential of the thumbnail image to supersede
Perfect 10's proposed sale of the images for display on cell phones. 280
Perfect 10 also stressed the sale of images to cell phones in arguments
270. Id. at 1157.
271. See id. at 1155-57.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 1155.
274. While the Ninth Circuit initially issued its opinion on May 16, 2007, it amended the
opinion on December 3, 2007. The primary change was to alter its holding that Perfect 10
bore the burden of showing Google infringement was not fair use. Cf. Perfect 10, Inc. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007). Citing precedent that "the burdens at the
preliminary injunction stage track the burdens at trial," the court concluded that once Per-
fect 10 showed a likelihood of success on the merits, Google was required to show a likeli-
hood that its affirmative fair use defense would succeed. Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1158.
275. Id. at 1177.
276. Id. at 1159-60.
277. Id. at 1159-61.
278. Id. at 1163-68 (citing Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003)).
279. Id. at 1167.
280. Id. at 1164-67.
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regarding the fourth fair use factor, effect of use on the market.2 81 The
court, however, twice noted that the record described no actual
downloads and that the "potential harm . . . remains hypothetical,"
thereby finding the factor to be neutral rather than in Perfect 10's
favor.282 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Google's fair
use defense was likely to succeed and vacated the district court's prelimi-
nary injunction. 283
Google did not escape unscathed, however, since the Fourth Circuit
considered Google's potential contributory liability for the display of in-
fringing images by third party websites. First, the court pointed to the
Supreme Court's decision in MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., which
divided contributory liability into two categories: actively encouraging in-
fringement or distributing a product used to infringe copyrights without a
substantial noninfringing use.284 Because "intent may be imputed,"
Google had potential liability under the first category.285 Looking also to
its own decision in A &M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., the Ninth Circuit
held that "a computer system operator can be held contributorily liable if
it 'has actual knowledge that specific infringing material is available using
its system,' and can 'take simple measures to prevent further damage' to
copyrighted works, yet continues to provide access to infringing
works. '286 The district court had not applied this test and more facts
were needed to make a determination, so the Ninth Circuit remanded the
issue of Google's contributory liability for further consideration.
287
B. FIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUBE-VIACOM INTERNATIONAL, INC.
v. YouTUBE, INC.,
Another Google entity, YouTube, Inc. ("YouTube"), also raises old
copyright issues through use of a new technology. YouTube hosts a web-
site where users may upload video and also view video that has been
uploaded by others.2 88 Once again, some of the content appearing on the
site is copyrighted. This copyrighted content has once again made
Google the target of suit for direct, contributory, and vicarious infringe-
ment, including a recent case by Viacom International, Inc. ("Viacom")
in the Southern District of New York, alleging over $1 billion in dam-
ages.289 Viacom is a media conglomerate whose affiliates include MTV
281. Id. at 1168.
282. Id. at 1166, 1168.
283. See id. at 1168-75.
284. Id. at 1170 (citing Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S.
913 (2005)).
285. Id. at 1171.
286. Id. at 1172 (citing A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir.
2001)).
287. Id. at 1172-73.
288. John E. Ottaviani and Glenn Pudelka, YouTube Suit Raises Novel Internet Copy-
right Issues, IPLaw360, PORTFOLIO MEDIA, Mar. 26, 2007.
289. See Amanda Ernst, YouTube, Google Face Class Action Infringement Suit,




Networks, Comedy Partners, Country Music Television, Inc., Paramount
Pictures Corp., and Black Entertainment Television LLC.290
In addition to the heft of the entities and potential damages at stake,
Viacom v. YouTube has generated interest due to its potential to interpret
two, recent, landmark pieces of copyright law: (1) the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act ("DMCA"), passed by Congress in 1998,291 and (2) the
Supreme Court's 2005 decision in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd.292
Google and YouTube have asserted that they are protected by the
DMCA's safe harbor provisions, appearing in 17 U.S.C. § 512.293 Within
§ 512, it is the third safe harbor, for "information residing on systems or
networks at direction of users" that may apply to YouTube. 294 However,
YouTube must establish that it meets several conditions in order to be
protected.295 First, the safe harbor applies to "service providers" and it is
not clear that YouTube meets the term as intended by the drafters. 296
Next, YouTube must show that (1) either YouTube has no actual knowl-
edge of infringing material and that YouTube is not aware of facts or
circumstances that would make infringing activity apparent (often re-
ferred to as "red flags") or that upon obtaining knowledge, YouTube acts
to remove access to the infringing material; (2) YouTube does not directly
benefit financially from infringing activity that YouTube has the right and
ability to control; and (3) upon notification of infringing activity. You-
Tube acts "expeditiously " to remove access to the infringing material. 297
Additionally, YouTube has been accused of contributory and vicarious
infringement, in addition to direct infringement.298 It has not been estab-
lished whether the DMCA safe harbor applies to indirect
infringement.2 99
In contrast, the Supreme Court opinion in Grokster dealt directly with
indirect infringement. 30 0 Although Grokster dealt with cases and copy-
right issues decided well after the passage of the DMCA, it did not ad-
dress the DMCA or its safe harbors. Instead, it addressed the use of
technology to copy and disseminate copyrighted works in violation of the
owner's copyright in the context of music, rather than video.3 0 Grokster
addressed prior Supreme Court precedent in Sony Corp. of America v.
290. See Ottaviani, supra note 287; Our Brands: Strengthening the Bond With Our Audi-
ences in Every Way, Viacom Inc., http://www.viacom.com/ourbrands/Pages/default.aspx.
291. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000).
292. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
293. Defs.' Answer at 10, Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 07-cv-02103
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2007).
294. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c).
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. See § 512(c)(1).
298. Pls.' Compl. at 21-25, Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 07-cv-02103
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2007).
299. See Ottaviani, supra note 288.
300. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 929-30 (2005).
301. See id. at 919-21.
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Universal City Studios, Inc. (involving a copying and sharing technology:
VCRs) and the influential Ninth Circuit decision in A&M Records v.
Napster.302
In the Grokster opinion by Justice Souter, the Court concluded that
"one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to in-
fringe a copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps
taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringe-
ment by third parties. '303 Further, the Court held that this rule "premises
liability on purposeful, culpable expression and conduct, and thus does
nothing to compromise legitimate commerce or discourage innovation
having a lawful promise. '30 4 Interestingly, the decision seemed to pre-
serve the "substantial noninfringing use" defense created by Sony, at
least in the absence of evidence of intent to cause infringement.
30 5
While Viacom v. You Tube presents many of the same issues that are at
the forefront of developing copyright law, these issues may not be ad-
dressed by the court for some time. Discovery is not scheduled to con-
clude until the end of 2008.306
V. CONCLUSION
Intellectual property continues to escalate in importance to the world,
United States, Texas, and East Texas economies. With that rising impor-
tance comes increased scrutiny. 2008 will be another significant year in
the ongoing development of our intellectual property laws. At the state
level, Texas will continue to be instrumental in the development of intel-
lectual property law-from the first applications of the new patent rules
of the Northern and Southern District of Texas, to the Eastern District of
Texas addressing some of the challenges incident to its popularity as a
patent litigation venue. At the national level, the Supreme Court has
made a concerted effort to harmonize patent law with the law in general
and the lower courts are taking notice. Copyright laws will continue to be
examined and interpreted in light of user-posted video sites like You-
Tube, and their implementation as news sources, such as with CNN's iRe-
port. Technology is pushing the economy in new directions with ever-
increasing speed and the laws governing intellectual property are con-
stantly evolving to keep up.
302. See id. at 924, 927 (discussing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417 (1984) and A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir.
2001)).
303. Id. at 936-37.
304. Id. at 937.
305. Id. at 939 n.12.
306. Scheduling Order at 4, Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 07-cv-02103
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2007).
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